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Abstract 
Maritime transport has been striving to reduce ship accidents since its origins, which results in loss of lives or 
properties and damage for the environment. Hence, a continuous effort to enhance safety is a crucial requirement 
for the maritime sector, for which several approaches have been tried for the past years. This paper presents the 
first results of a study which aim is to assess the factors affecting collision accidents in order to enhance safety and 
resilience. This aim is achieved by using Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs) method, which consider and evaluates 
importance of these factor by calculating and assigning individual weights to them. Moreover, FCM appears to be 
a suitable approach since it can take into account both, fuzzy data and past accidents experiences. Hence, in this 
paper with the help of FCM, past accidents from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) database 
regarding collision are analysed to identify the contributors of collision accidents and their FCM weightings.  
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Nomenclature 
FCMs Fuzzy Cognitive Maps  
MAIB Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
1. Introduction  
Maritime transport has been characterised by ship accidents since its origins, with significant consequences and 
impact on society (Eliopoulou et al., 2016). Traditionally, an accident was defined by Kristiansen (2013) DV³DQ
undesirable event that results in damage humans, assets DQGRUWKHHQYLURQPHQW´,QWKHODVWWHQ\HDUVWKHVKLSSLQJ
industry has implemented different measures designed to improve its safety level. Despite these actions, shipping 
accidents, and particularly collisions, remain a major concern considering that around 90% of world trading is 
carried out by the maritime sector according to Chauvin et al. (2013).  
 
Analysing the literature, it becomes evident that humans have played a major role in past accidents (Smith et al., 
2017). The statistics indicate that human factors are the major cause of at least 66% of the accidents and more than 
90% of the incidents in different industries, i.e. aerospace or nuclear (Azadeh and Zarrin, 2016). For instance, in 
aviation between 70% and 80% of the accidents are connected with human errors as described by O'Hare et al. 
(1994). Regarding the maritime sector, Rothblum (2000) LQGLFDWHVWKDW³DERXW±96% of marine casualties are 
FDXVHGDWOHDVWLQSDUWE\VRPHIRUPRIKXPDQHUURU´Graziano et al. (2016) explain WKDW³KXPDQIDFWRUV«DUH
LPSOLFDWHGLQRIPDULQHFDVXDOWLHV´DQGTuran et al. (2016) identify WKDW³PRUHWKDQRIVKLSSLQJDFFLGHQts 
DUHDWWULEXWHGWR+XPDQRUJDQLVDWLRQDO(UURU´Hence, considering how human elements affects accidents, in the 
last years the maritime sector has developed an increasing interest in the understanding of the importance of the 
human elements, resulting in more research on board focused on human factors (Kurt et al., 2016).  
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse both human and technical factor contributing to collision accidents. These 
factors are obtained from analysing a database provided by the MAIB, which investigates marine accidents 
involving UK vessels worldwide and all vessels operating in UK territorial waters. It provides information for 211 
vessels for the period 2000-2011. As it was mentioned before, particularly collisions, remain a major concern when 
analysing the number of shipping accidents occurred, therefore, this study will be focus in collision accidents. In 
the next sections of this paper a FCM will be created in order to show both human and technical factors, and their 
interrelations that contribute to maritime collision accidents. 
2. Methodology 
With the aim to model an FCM that will represent the relation between human and technical factors within collision 
accidents the following steps are followed: Firstly, the FCM method is briefly explained. Secondly, the factors that 
are responsible for collision accidents are defined. It is important to mention that these factors have been 
established and defined by the MAIB, hence, the nomenclature may vary from other sources in the literature 
referring human factors. Thirdly, the initial state vector is selected. For this study, two different initial state vectors 
are considered in order to compare how they will affect the final weight of the collision factors. Then, the required 
interaction matrix for the FCM is calculated, showing the relation between all the collision factors. Finally, the 
threshold function is applied obtaining the final weight distribution of factors in collision accidents. 
2.1. Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs) 
When an accident occurs, the different factors that leaded to it are interconnected, hence, developing a model for 
analysing these connections becomes to be a crucial target. Maritime accidents are characterised as complex 
processes in which there is no a simple solution to prevent them (Kristiansen, 2013), therefore, due to the vagueness 
and data unavailability regarding accidents, and that this study is based on data collected from past experiences, a 
method that can deal with both as the FCMs method should be applied (Azadeh et al., 2014).  
 
As defined by Eden (1988), FCMs are extensions of cognitive maps aiming to model complex chains of casual 
relationships and they have become a potential tool for modelling and analysing dynamic interactions between 
concepts in the past years (Lee et al., 1996). Cognitive maps were created by Axelrod (1976) in the 1970s, aiming 
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to represent social scientific knowledge. Then, evolving from them Kosko (1986) developed fuzzified cognitive 
maps, mainly characterised by three components: the characteristics of the system, signed and weighted arcs 
representing the interrelations within the elements. The main target in a FCM is to define the relations between the 
concepts represented, understanding the global structure and the dynamics of the system (Azadeh et al., 2014). 
2.1.1. FCMs mathematical representation  
Within a FCM, each of the concepts is represented by a number, Ai that represents its value within the interval 
[0,1]. León et al. (2010) assure that it is possible to identify three types of connections between the concepts 
described in the FCM that represents the nature of their respective influence: 
x The weights between the concepts Ci and Cj would be positive (Wij>0). Hence, an increase in the first concept 
will lead to an increase in the second concept and vice versa. 
x The weights between the concepts Ci and Cj would be negative (Wij<0). Then, an increase in the first concept 
will lead to a decrease in the second concept and vice versa. 
x As a last case, a zero causality (Wij=0) means there is no relation between that two concepts in particular. 
According with Kosko (1986), a traditional formula to calculate the values of the concepts in a FCM is as follow: 
     1
1, 1
n
t t t
i i ji j
j j
A f A W A
 z
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹¦           (1) 
In which ܣ௜ሺ௧ାଵሻ represents the value of Ci at the step t+1, f is the threshold function which will make sure the 
concept value is limited within the interval [0,1], ௝ܹ௜ represents the weight between both concepts Ci and Cj , and ܣ௝ሺ௧ሻ is the value of the concept Cj at step t. Although there are plenty threshold functions available for performing 
a FCM, three of them are considered significant according to Mohr (1997): 
x The bivalent threshold function. The threshold function could adopt two possible values, 0 when there is no 
relation between two concepts, or 1, when both concepts are linked. 
x The trivalent threshold function. It is an extension of the previous function, which could adopt a third value, 
-1, in order to represent concepts with a negative weight relation. 
x The logistic signal function, also known as the Sigmoid function, which provides a truly fuzzy conceptual 
states giving any possible value within the interval [0,1] and it has been proved by Bueno and Salmeron 
(2009) that using this function provides greater benefits than the mentioned above. Hence, this function is 
selected (Equation 2), in which ߣ is the constant which determines the degree of fuzzification of the function: 
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For representing a FCM there are three main elements which allow to apply the FCM to a set of concepts: 
x An interaction matrix with dimension n x n where n indicates the number of concepts involve in the FCM. 
Fig. 1 shows on the left an example of a simple FCM, while on the right it shows its equivalent transition 
matrix. Zero elements indicate that a relation does not exist between two particular elements, while non-
zero elements show not only that there is a relation but also the strength or weight of that relation. 
 
 
Fig. 1 (a) A simple representation of a FCM; (b) Equivalent transition matrix 
x An initial state vector, which shows the initial value of the concepts (during step 0).  
x A threshold function with the characteristics and properties described previously.  
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Once the FCM starts being developed, at each time step (step 1, step 2 etc.) the values of the concepts will be 
obtained following Equation 1 until the process stop, which could happens in three different scenarios (Kosko, 
1994); (Khan et al., 2001); (Xiao et al., 2012): 
x The FCM reaches equilibrium. This situation occurs when after two consecutive steps repeating the process 
both state vectors obtained are identical. In this situation the simulation stop. 
x The FCM does not produce a stable state vector. Instead of that, it keeps cycling between a number of values 
IRUH[DPSOH«7KLVVLWXDWLRQLVNQRZQDVWKHµOLPLWF\FOH¶ 
x A last possibility occurs when the FCM does not reach identical values, producing different state vectors 
IRUHDFKVWHS7KLVSRVVLELOLW\LVGHILQHGDVµFKDRV¶DQGLWFDQDSSHDULQFRPSOH[VFHQDULRV 
2.1.2. FCMs application  
Despite of the fact that FCM is not as well-known as other methods (Papakostas et al., 2012, Papakostas et al., 
2008), it has been proved to be very promising and worth of further investigation and development (Vergini and 
Groumpos, 2016). Several studies have addressed the application of FCMs as a classification tool in different fields 
for the past years, proving that FCM is not only a well validated classification tool but also its effectiveness.  
 
FCMs have been mainly used in terms of planning and decision making (Dodurka et al., 2017), nevertheless, the 
interest from both researcher and industry is increasing and FCMs are specially interested regarding the areas of 
medicine (Papageorgiou and Froelich, 2012), control (Papageorgiou et al., 2006), business (Glykas, 2013), robotics 
(Motlagh et al., 2012), environmental science (Kok, 2009), education (Yesil et al., 2013), energy efficiency 
(Mpelogianni et al., 2015) and information technology %\N|]NDQDQG9DUGDOR÷OX. 
 
Finally, in order to demonstrate the potential of FCM for the maritime domain, this method has been applied to 
the MAIB database, but it could also be applied to a specific case in a company, proving that with the proper data 
collected it is possible to determine the interrelation between accident factors when an accident takes place. 
2.2. Human and technical factors affecting collision accidents 
The factors that are considered within this study are obtained from analysing a database provided by the MAIB 
for the period 2000-2011, filtered by ships involved in collision, resulting in 872 accidents and 211 different 
vessels. This database is composed by sixty-eight factors, both human and technical, which are directly responsible 
of collision accidents. However, creating a FCM with all these elements would result in a complex model which 
would take a great amount of time and resources. Hence, following the Pareto rule (roughly 80% of the effects 
come from 20% of the causes), the original sixty-eight factors that were found in collision are analysed in order to 
determine which of them will be considered for this study, as it is shown in Table 1, from where it is possible to 
see that twenty-three out of sixty eight factors (33.82% of the causes) have as a result 80.16% of collision accidents. 
     Table 1. Factors that lead to collision accidents (statistical analysis of MAIB database). 
Factor 
number 
Collision 
accident factors 
Total 
number of 
accidents 
(%) 
Accumulative 
percentage 
(%) 
Factor 
number 
Collision accident 
factors 
Total 
number 
of 
accident
s (%) 
Accumulative 
percentage 
(%) 
1 Complacency 9.29 9.29 13 Competence 2.18 63.99 
2 Procedures 
inadequate 
7.80 17.09 14 Knowledge of 
regulations/standa
rds inadequate 
1.83 65.83 
3 Inattention 7.34 24.43 15 Poor decision 
making/informati
on use 
1.83 67.66 
4 Situational 
awareness or 
communication 
inadequate 
7.34 31.77 16 Understimulation 1.83 69.50 
5 Lack of 
communication 
or co-ordination 
5.96 37.73 17 Inadequate 
management of 
physical resources 
1.61 71.10 
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Factor 
number 
Collision 
accident factors 
Total 
number of 
accidents 
(%) 
Accumulative 
percentage 
(%) 
Factor 
number 
Collision accident 
factors 
Total 
number 
of 
accident
s (%) 
Accumulative 
percentage 
(%) 
6 Misapplication 
of regulations 
policies, 
procedures or 
practices 
5.73 43.46 18 Other Vessel 1.61 72.71 
7 Vigilance 5.05 48.51 19 Perception of risk 1.61 74.31 
8 Diminished 
motivation 
3.21 51.72 20 Equipment misuse 1.49 75.80 
9 Safety culture 3.10 54.82 21 Fatigue 1.49 77.29 
10 Company 
standing orders 
inadequate 
insufficient, 
conflicting 
2.41 57.22 22 Social factors 1.49 78.78 
11 Perception 
abilities 
2.29 59.52 23 Current 1.38 80.16 
12 Personality 2.29 61.81     
 
The previous concepts are adapted from a guidance for external user that MAIB as below: 
x Factor 1 - Complacency: An organization or individual is dissatisfied with performance. 
x Factor 2 - Procedures inadequate: Lack of information in the standing order, open to misunderstanding. 
x Factor 3 - Inattention: Loss of attention, including for example failing to monitor displays or forgetting to 
perform a specific duty. It may also be due to other causes like personal problems, fatigue, etc. 
x Factor 4 - Situational awareness or communication inadequate: Incorrect understanding of the situation 
which can lead to faulty hypothesis. For example, incorrect interpretation of alarms on board. 
x Factor 5 - Lack of communication or co-ordination: Not making use of all available information sources to 
determine current status. For example, poor communication between bridge officers. 
x Factor 6 - Misapplication of regulations, policies, procedures or practices: Application of regulations at an 
incorrect time or circumstances. 
x Factor 7 - Vigilance: Ability to keep attention to monitor the vessel adequately. 
x Factor 8 - Diminished motivation: Lack of desire to perform well, resulting in a decrease of performance. 
x Factor 9 - Safety culture: Characteristics of large-scale bodies (operating companies, industry sectors) that 
influence the approach taken to safety issues. 
x Factor 10 - Company standing orders inadequate, insufficient, and conflicting: The policy, standards, etc. 
may all contribute to the incident being inadequate or safety procedures may not be operating. 
x Factor 11 - Perception abilities: Abilities of the individual in terms of perception i.e. visual, auditory, etc. 
x Factor 12 - Personality: Relative enduring characteristics of behavior. 
x Factor 13 - Competence: Not competent to carry out the duties assign.  
x Factor 14 - Knowledge of regulations/standards inadequate: Lack of knowledge to understand regulations 
due to lack of experience/training. 
x Factor 15 - Poor decision making/information use: Any problem with standards, regulations, etc. may be 
conflicting, resulting in a poor decision. 
x Factor 16 - Understimulation: Degradation of performance due to monotony. 
x Factor 17 - Inadequate management of physical resources: Poor management of tools, equipment, etc. 
needed to perform tasks.  
x Factor 18 - Other Vessel: The cause of the accident was other ship. 
x Factor 19 - Perception of risk: Abilities of the individual in terms of risk perception. 
x Factor 20 - Equipment misuse: Intentional abuse of equipment provided or an over use.  
x Factor 21 - Fatigue: Fatigue can result in a variety of factors and is variable amongst individuals. It depends 
on the watch keeping system and shipboard policies.  
x Factor 22 - Social factors: Interactions within small groups or teams. 
x Factor 23 - Current: The accident was caused by hazardous natural environment like strong currents. 
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2.3. Initial state vector 
For this study, two different initial state vectors are considered in order to observe if they will affect the weight of 
the collision factors. For the first case, the initial state vector is defined as the percentage of each factor within the 
total number of accidents. For example, the first component ³complacency´ appears in 81 accidents out of 872 
which can be translated as a 9.3% of the 872 accidents. However, these factors needs to be normalized to be within 
the interval [0,1] (Xiao et al., 2012), hence, the value for this component will be 0.093. For the second case, the 
initial state vector is defined as the percentage of each components within the total number of vessels. Then, 
³complacency´ appears register as a main cause in 13 vessels out of 211 which can be translated as a 6.2% of the 
total number of vessels. Table 2 shows both initial state vectors for all the collision factors considered.  
     Table 2. Initial state vectors considering for the FCM. 
Factor number First 
state 
vector 
Second 
state 
vector 
Factor 
number 
First 
state 
vector 
Second 
state 
vector 
Factor 
number 
First state 
vector 
Second 
state 
vector 
1 0.09 0.06 9 0.03 0.00 17 0.02 0.03 
2 0.08 0.06 10 0.02 0.03 18 0.02 0.04 
3 0.07 0.08 11 0.02 0.03 19 0.02 0.03 
4 0.07 0.05 12 0.02 0.01 20 0.01 0.01 
5 0.06 0.04 13 0.02 0.04 21 0.01 0.02 
6 0.06 0.05 14 0.02 0.01 22 0.01 0.01 
7 0.05 0.05 15 0.02 0.03 23 0.01 0.02 
8 0.03 0.01 16 0.02 0.01    
2.4. Final Interaction matrix 
In order to create the interaction matrix, the database is analysed, comparing each pair of accident components. 
For example, in order to determinate the relation between ³complacency´ and ³procedures inadequate´ the 
database is filtered by the accidents that present ³complacency´ (81 accidents), and by the accidents that present 
³procedures LQDGHTXDWH´ (68 accidents). Then, the number of accidents is filtered one more time by the accidents 
from ³complacency´ that show ³procedures inadequate´ as a second factor of the accident, resulting in 61 
coincidences. Following the same procedure, there are 53 accidents from ³procedures inadequate´ that also show 
³complacency´ as a second factor. In this way the weight of the component ³complacency´ over ³procedures 
inadequate´ is the relation between the accidents from ³complacency´ that ³show procedures inadequate´ as a 
second factor and all the accidents with ³complacency´, resulting in a weight of 0.75. In the same way, the weight 
of the component ³procedures inadequate´ over ³complacency´ is the relation between accidents from ³procedures 
inadequate´ that also show ³complacency´ and the accidents with ³procedures inadequate´, resulting in a weight 
of 0.78. The same process is repeated in order to obtain relations and weights of each pair of components. 
 
Once the initial state vector and the interaction matrix are defined, the threshold function selected (the logistic 
signal function described before) is applied. For both case studies, the FCM reaches equilibrium after five steps. 
The results comparison and the discussion are described in the next section of this study. 
3. Results and discussion  
As it was mentioned before, the MAIB database is used to weight each contributing factors of collision accidents. 
Table 3 shows the equilibrium for both initial state vectors defined, which is reached at step 5 in both cases. As it 
can be observed from the table, for both cases the results of applying the FCM method are the same, which allows 
to conclude that the selection of the initial state vector is not a significant factor affecting the development of a 
FCM for this study. Fig. 2 shows the evolution of the different components of collision accidents for the time steps 
of the process until equilibrium is reached at step 5. 
 
Analysing the results, it is clearly shown that there are 15 factors that leads collision accidents with a normalized 
weight higher than 4.5%. Furthermore, from all the components studied, just two are related with technical factors 
instead of human factors. These components are ³other vessels´ and ³current´, and their weight are at the bottom 
of the ranking, just before ³perception of risk´ and ³poor decision making/information use´, which supports the 
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theory regarding human factors as the main cause in maritime accidents (Rothblum, 2000); (Graziano et al., 2016); 
(Turan et al., 2016) and specially in collision accidents as it was shown in this case study. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Values of collision factors for first state vector until convergence is reached 
Table 3. Final weight of contributors to maritime collision accidents. 
Factor number Weight from 
FCM with first 
state vector 
Weight 
normalized with 
first state vector 
(%) 
Weight from 
FCM with 
second state 
vector 
Weight 
normalized with 
Second state 
vector (%) 
1 0.9999 4.89 0.9999 4.89 
2 1.0000 4.89 1.0000 4.89 
3 1.0000 4.89 1.0000 4.89 
4 1.0000 4.89 1.0000 4.89 
5 0.9999 4.89 0.9999 4.89 
6 1.0000 4.89 1.0000 4.89 
7 1.0000 4.89 1.0000 4.89 
8 0.9991 4.88 0.9991 4.88 
9 0.9990 4.88 0.9990 4.88 
10 0.9998 4.89 0.9998 4.89 
11 0.9464 4.63 0.9464 4.63 
12 0.9993 4.88 0.9993 4.88 
13 0.7622 3.73 0.7622 3.73 
14 0.6820 3.33 0.6820 3.33 
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Procedures inadequate
Inattention
Situational awareness or communication inadequate
Lack of communication or co-ordination
Misapplication of regulations, policies, procedures
or practices
Vigilance
Diminished motivation
Safety culture
Company standing orders inadequate, insufficient,
conflicting
Perception abilities
Personality
Competence
Knowledge of regulations/standards inadequate
Poor decision making/information use
Understimulation
Inadequate management of physical resources
Other Vessel
Perception of risk
Equipment misuse
Fatigue
Social factors
Current
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Factor number Weight from 
FCM with first 
state vector 
Weight 
normalized with 
first state vector 
(%) 
Weight from 
FCM with 
second state 
vector 
Weight 
normalized with 
Second state 
vector (%) 
15 0.5328 2.60 0.5328 2.60 
16 0.9991 4.88 0.9991 4.88 
17 0.9045 4.42 0.9045 4.42 
18 0.5852 2.86 0.5852 2.86 
19 0.5800 2.83 0.5800 2.83 
20 0.9998 4.89 0.9998 4.89 
21 0.8501 4.15 0.8501 4.15 
22 0.9995 4.88 0.9995 4.88 
23 0.6225 3.04 0.6224 3.04 
 
Furthermore, comparing the weighted factors obtained through a FCM with the factors obtained from a statistical 
analysis in Table 1, it is possible to observe from Figure 3 how the importance of the factors vary in both methods. 
The factors shown in Figure 3 were defined in the previous section, as it can be observed, in some cases the factors 
differ completely by using one or another method like the factor from the statistical analysis in the twentieth 
SRVLWLRQ³(TXLSPHQWPLVXVH´ZKLFKDSSHDULQWKHQLQWh position by using FCM. This is due to the fact that By 
using FCMs, the factors that lead to accidents are not only listed and weighted independently but also all the 
interactions between factors are considered. This method differs from a pure statistical analysis in the sense that 
an element may appear less times (being less important in a statistical way) but it may be linked with more accident 
factors leading to a more complex accident (higher weight in a FCM). 
Figure 3. Comparison between accidents factor from FCM and statistical accidents. 
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Finally, in order to demonstrate the changes in FCM weighting through the years, the period between 2000 and 
2011 was divided into three sections (four years each). From the results in Figure 4 it can be observed that the 
different factors change over time. However, a detailed sensitivity analysis was not conducted to analyse these 
weight variations. Furthermore, in order to improve visibility, Figure 4 was divided into four smaller graphs. 
Fig. 4 Accidents factors variation over time through a FCM 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, a new modelling and simulation approach based on FCMs was proposed for assessing the factors 
that lead to collision accidents within the maritime sector. The main target that was aim to achieve was not only 
to propose a new classification of factors leading to collision accidents based on the MAIB available data but also 
to propose the use of a tool which allows complex process representation and analysis.  
 
For this study other consideration could have been taken into account, for instance, a further extension of the FCM 
analysis, considering all the factors that take a part in the process. Furthermore, the data analysed was taken from 
a database between 2000 and 2011, hence, a more up-to-date database could be analyse to compare if the factors 
that caused accidents in the past have been addressed thought safety measures or if they are still leading to collision 
accidents. Moreover, this method could be applied in other sectors, i.e. aviation, in order to compare how human 
factors causing accidents differ between transport modes. In addition, from the study over time it was observed 
that the weight of the concepts changes, hence, for further studies the factors could be analysed annually. 
 
This study is conducted as part of a PhD study, in further stages of this PhD study, a similar FCM based on expert 
RSLQLRQ ZLOO EH FUHDWHG WR FRPSDUHKRZ WKH FROOLVLRQ FRQWULEXWRUV¶ FODVVLILFDWLRQREWDLQHG WKURXJK UHDO GDWD LV
affected when expert opinion enter in the equation. Finally, a final factor list will be identified considering both 
)&0VFUHDWHGLQRUGHUWRGHYHORSPHDVXUHVDQGUHFRPPHQGDWLRQIRUUHGXFLQJWKHDFFLGHQWV¶UDWHRQWKHIXWXUH 
5. References 
Axelrod, R. M. 1976. Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites, Princeton University Press. 
Azadeh, A., Salehi, V., Arvan, M. & Dolatkhah, M. 2014. Assessment of resilience engineering factors in high-risk environments by fuzzy 
Author name / TRA2018, Vienna, Austria, April 16-19, 2018 
 
cognitive maps: A petrochemical plant. Safety Science, 68, 99-107. 
Azadeh, A. & Zarrin, M. 2016. An intelligent framework for productivity assessment and analysis of human resource from resilience 
engineering, motivational factors, HSE and ergonomics perspectives. Safety Science, 89, 55-71. 
Bueno, S. & Salmeron, J. L. 2009. Benchmarking main activation functions in fuzzy cognitive maps. Expert Systems with Applications, 36, 
5221-5229. 
Büyüközkan, G. & 9DUGDOR÷OX=$QDO\]LQJRI&3)5VXFFHVVIDFWRUVXVLQJIX]]\FRJQLWLYHPDSVLQUHWDLOLQGXVWU\Expert Systems with 
Applications, 39, 10438-10455. 
Chauvin, C., Lardjane, S., Morel, G., Clostermann, J.-P. & Langard, B. 2013. Human and organisational factors in maritime accidents: Analysis 
of collisions at sea using the HFACS. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 59, 26-37. 
Dodurka, M. F., Yesil, E. & Urbas, L. 2017. Causal effect analysis for fuzzy cognitive maps designed with non-singleton fuzzy numbers. 
Neurocomputing, 232, 122-132. 
Eden, C. 1988. Cognitive mapping. European Journal of Operational Research, 36, 1-13. 
Eliopoulou, E., Papanikolaou, A. & Voulgarellis, M. 2016. Statistical analysis of ship accidents and review of safety level. Safety Science, 85, 
282-292. 
Glykas, M. 2013. Fuzzy cognitive strategic maps in business process performance measurement. Expert Systems with Applications, 40, 1-14. 
Graziano, A., Teixeira, A. P. & Guedes Soares, C. 2016. Classification of human errors in grounding and collision accidents using the TRACEr 
taxonomy. Safety Science, 86, 245-257. 
Khan, M., Quaddus, M. & Intrapairot, A. Application of a Fuzzy Cognitive Map for Analysing Data Warehouse Diffusion.  Applied 
informatics-proceedings, 2001. 32-37. 
Kok, K. 2009. The potential of Fuzzy Cognitive Maps for semi-quantitative scenario development, with an example from Brazil. Global 
Environmental Change, 19, 122-133. 
Kosko, B. 1986. Fuzzy cognitive maps. International journal of man-machine studies, 24, 65-75. 
Kosko, B. 1994. The new science of fuzzy logic: fuzzy thinking. HarperCollins, LondonLane DC, Oliva R (1998) The greater whole: towards 
a synthesis of the system dynamics and soft system methodology. Eur J Oper Res, 107, 214235Lee. 
Kristiansen, S. 2013. Maritime Transportation: Safety Management and Risk Analysis, Taylor & Francis. 
Kurt, R. E., Khalid, H., Turan, O., Houben, M., Bos, J. & Helvacioglu, I. H. 2016. Towards human-oriented norms: Considering the effects of 
noise exposure on board ships. Ocean Engineering, 120, 101-107. 
Lee, K., Kim, S. & Sakawa, M. 1996. On-line fault diagnosis by using fuzzy cognitive map. IEICE transactions on fundamentals of electronics, 
communications and computer sciences, 79, 921-927. 
León, M., Rodriguez, C., García, M. M., Bello, R. & Vanhoof, K. Fuzzy cognitive maps for modeling complex systems.  Mexican International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010. Springer, 166-174. 
Mohr, S. 1997. Software design for a fuzzy cognitive map modeling tool. Tensselaer Polytechnic Institute. 
Motlagh, O., Tang, S. H., Ismail, N. & Ramli, A. R. 2012. An expert fuzzy cognitive map for reactive navigation of mobile robots. Fuzzy Sets 
and Systems, 201, 105-121. 
Mpelogianni, V., Marnetta, P. & Groumpos, P. P. 2015. Fuzzy Cognitive Maps in the Service of Energy Efficiency. IFAC-PapersOnLine, 48, 
1-6. 
O'Hare, D., Wiggins, M., Batt, R. & Morrison, D. 1994. Cognitive failure analysis for aircraft accident investigation. Ergonomics, 37, 1855-
1869. 
Papageorgiou, E. I. & Froelich, W. 2012. Multi-step prediction of pulmonary infection with the use of evolutionary fuzzy cognitive maps. 
Neurocomputing, 92, 28-35. 
Papageorgiou, E. I., Stylios, C. & Groumpos, P. P. 2006. Unsupervised learning techniques for fine-tuning fuzzy cognitive map causal links. 
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 64, 727-743. 
Papakostas, G. A., Boutalis, Y. S., Koulouriotis, D. E. & Mertzios, B. G. 2008. Fuzzy cognitive maps for pattern recognition applications. 
International Journal of Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence, 22, 1461-1486. 
Papakostas, G. A., Koulouriotis, D. E., Polydoros, A. S. & Tourassis, V. D. 2012. Towards Hebbian learning of fuzzy cognitive maps in pattern 
classification problems. Expert Systems with Applications, 39, 10620-10629. 
Rothblum, A. M. Human error and marine safety.  National Safety Council Congress and Expo, Orlando, FL, 2000. 
Smith, D., Veitch, B., Khan, F. & Taylor, R. 2017. Understanding industrial safety: Comparing Fault tree, Bayesian network, and FRAM 
approaches. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 45, 88-101. 
Turan, O., Kurt, R. E., Arslan, V., Silvagni, S., Ducci, M., Liston, P., Schraagen, J. M., Fang, I. & Papadakis, G. 2016. Can We Learn from 
Aviation: Safety Enhancements in Transport by Achieving Human Orientated Resilient Shipping Environment. Transportation 
Research Procedia, 14, 1669-1678. 
Vergini, E. S. & Groumpos, P. P. 2016. A new conception on the Fuzzy Cognitive Maps method. IFAC-PapersOnLine, 49, 300-304. 
Xiao, Z., Chen, W. & Li, L. 2012. An integrated FCM and fuzzy soft set for supplier selection problem based on risk evaluation. Applied 
Mathematical Modelling, 36, 1444-1454. 
Yesil, E., Ozturk, C., Dodurka, M. F. & Sahin, A. Control engineering education critical success factors modeling via Fuzzy Cognitive Maps.  
Information Technology Based Higher Education and Training (ITHET), 2013 International Conference on, 2013. IEEE, 1-8. 
